Order for Second Reading read.—[Queen's Consent, on behalf of the Crown, signified.]

Clare Short: My hon. Friend is right. It is for the Prime Minister to decide whether to bring the issue before Parliament. He or she can do so or not do so; in the case of the Kosovo war, there was no vote in Parliament. There is the argument that there was a vote before the Iraq war. At the last minute, when the troops were on the ground and when arms were being twisted, the Prime Minister was saying, "Please do not humiliate me in this situation." I do not think that that is adequate consultation of with Parliament. It is not the way to make good decisions to protect our armed forces and the dignity and authority of our country.
	As most Members of Parliament are aware, many people in Britain are very disillusioned with our constitutional arrangements and the weakness of our democracy. An elderly Iraqi engineer who had spent most of his life in the UK summarised the situation to me some time ago. He said that this is the freest country in the world; we can buy any book, arrange any meeting, organise any demonstration and have any discussion—the only problem is that the Government do not take a blind bit of notice of what the people are thinking. It is a very free country, in the sense of freedom of discussion, although there are proposals that might curtail that, but the distance between public opinion and the power of the Executive is too great in our constitutional system, and it is causing disgruntlement across the land.
	It was Lord Hailsham in 1976 who said that we have an elective dictatorship, and power has centralised in the office of the Prime Minister very much further since then. I know many people who went on the march against the Iraq war on 15 February 2003, which was probably the biggest demonstration that has ever taken place in British history. As all Members will know, many, many people went on that demonstration who had never been on a political demonstration before in their lives. Many people are now very disillusioned and feel that they cannot get politicians to listen to public opinion in the UK.

Clare Short: No, I will get on a little, if I may.
	Politicians are increasingly held in contempt and a declining percentage of people feel that there is any point in voting and that we should be worried about that, and many Members of the House are. Given that there is no more serious decision that politicians can make than the taking and sacrificing of human life in war and the unleashing of the ugliness of war, which no matter how justified is always an ugly thing, our democracy is surely deeply flawed when the people whom the public elect have no power to approve or disapprove the deployment of our armed forces.

Clare Short: The hon. Gentleman is right that many hon. Members who voted for the war, having seen many documents that have come out since as a result of the Hutton inquiry and the Butler report, as well as the leaked document, feel that they were duped, and feel angry about it. This is a serious set of issues: the situation that we have in Iraq, how we got there, where we are now and how we get out of it to the benefit of all concerned, and the lessons for the constitution and on how to improve the quality of our decision making. We should all consider those matters and not throw brickbats at each other.
	The Bill is very straightforward in conception. It lays down that Parliament's approval must be sought before the deployment of British forces in military action. It requires that when the Prime Minister proposes military action, he must lay before both House of Parliament a report setting out the reasons for the proposed action, the legal authority for it—would that not be a desirable thing?—and, to answer the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Telford (David Wright), any detail that he thinks appropriate on its geographical extent, expected duration and which elements of the armed forces are to be deployed. The Prime Minister would have a lot of discretion on how much detail he provides to the House of Commons.

Andrew Dismore: My right hon. Friend has made great play about the importance of democracy and the right of the elected representatives of the people to make a decision. How does she square that with effectively giving a veto to the other place through her requirement that both Houses should approve such a decision? Given her position on reform of the House of Lords, would it not be more appropriate for reform to come before consideration of this Bill?

Clare Short: I think that my hon. Friend will agree that we are committed as a party and as a Government to reform of the House of Lords, so he does not have to worry. When contentious legislation is introduced, many people, including me, hope that it will be properly scrutinised in the Lords, because, although we have an appointed House, it is appointed in proportion to the voting behaviour of the country. The Lords is a better scrutineer of the Executive than this House, which undermines this House's authority.

Menzies Campbell: On the legal case for war, does the right hon. Lady anticipate that, before the decision was taken by this House to support the Government's policy, the House of Commons would see an extensive opinion, such as the 13-page document produced by the Attorney-General on 7 March, rather than the one-page response to a question in the other place on the day?

Clare Short: I agree with the hon. Gentleman that having a vote before any troops are deployed would allow the whole issue to be properly considered. Once the troops are on the ground, Parliament is in a very difficult situation. Many hon. Members voted against their better judgment because troops had been committed, and the Bill would ensure that that does not happen again.
	The Bill also provides for a situation in which the Prime Minister decides that participation in armed conflict is urgent and that deployment should begin before a report is laid before Parliament. In those circumstances, retrospective approval can be sought as soon as it is practicable to do so. If retrospective approval is denied, the forces would have to be withdrawn within 30 days, or a longer period could be allowed if the Prime Minister considered that it was needed in order to organise a withdrawal. If Parliament were not sitting or immediate action were needed, the Bill would allow the Prime Minister to come to Parliament after troops had been deployed.

David Heath: It might have more sensible for the hon. Gentleman to allow me to make my speech instead of intervening during the opening sentences. The legal advice states a very clear position that would have made a difference—[Interruption.] If the hon. Gentleman would stop chuntering from sedentary position he would hear my answer. I am told that the legal advice would have changed the views of several of his hon. Friends, quite apart from anybody else. It would not have changed the views of any Liberal Democrat Members because, from the start, we were united in our opposition to the war.
	I am a Member of Parliament who represents a military establishment—royal naval air station Yeovilton, which I frequently visit to speak to the people stationed there. I have 40 Commando very nearby, and many of those Royal Marines live in my constituency. The infantry at Warminster are also very close. The serving forces personnel and their families who expressed their concerns to me expected that their Member of Parliament would have some influence, albeit small, on what was going to happen in relation to their futures. The same should go for every Member of this House, as I am sure that we all have service family constituents. I hope that some of us feel that before we commit young men and women to conflict we should, at least metaphorically, walk a mile in their boots in order to understand what we are asking them to do in our name.
	The phrase, "in our name", is also a factor for the wider population, because when we enter a conflict, we do so in the name of the people of the United Kingdom, who believe that their democratic systems have some influence on that decision. The right hon. Lady is right to say that this is a matter of democracy—it is about democratic renewal and making our democracy fit for the circumstances of a modern country. If one wants to find a reason for the apparent disengagement of the public from the political process, one need look no further than the fact that it appears that the people whom they elect do not have the capacity to play a part in the most important decision that comes before the body politic. Why on earth should they rely on the ballot box if their elected representatives have no say in such a crucial matter?

David Heath: I am sorry but I shall not take a further intervention on that point.
	There are questions about definition, which need to be considered seriously in Committee and on Report. As I said earlier, we no longer have simple declarations of war. Things have moved on a little since Henry VIII. Many academics argue that there will never be a declaration of war again and that we now engage in conflict within the parameters of United Nations resolutions—or otherwise. The same goes for peacekeeping or peacemaking expeditions. Many conflicts fall short of a declaration of war by one state on another, so we must therefore explore the required definition in Committee but that is no reason for opposing Second Reading.
	The worst argument against the Bill is that the House might disagree with the Executive. That is our right as a Parliament. If the Executive cannot command the support of the House, they have no business sending forces into conflict. It is inconceivable that that should happen.
	There is much to be said for the Bill. It brings our constitution up to date and sets down what will increasingly, and necessarily, be the practice. It has the huge advantage of conferring legitimacy on actions that Her Majesty's forces take and would ensure that the legal advice on which action is taken came before the House. The latter is controversial in the context of the Iraq conflict, but there is a deficiency in the Attorney-General's job description. I believe that the Attorney-General has a duty to the country as well as to the Executive in providing advice, and especially to the Crown in Parliament. That means giving advice to the elected House.
	It is important to forces in the field that they have a prior indication of support from the House. Support after the beginning of a conflict is different. Those of us who strongly oppose the deployment of our forces will not oppose the interests of our troops in the field because they are our sons and daughters, our families and our friends who are in danger, acting on behalf of this country. Of course we support them in the field but we may have grave doubts about the wisdom and the correctness of their being deployed.
	The measure is supported by a wide range of hon. Members, including senior members of the Government and previous members of the Government. One only wishes that Robin Cook were here to lend his support in person.
	I am in a pleasant position because the Bill reflects my party's policy. Although it is a private Member's Bill, I have no hesitation in asking my hon. Friends to support it. I hope that all hon. Members will support it because it concerns Parliament asserting its rights in a democracy and affirming the fact that it speaks for the people of Britain. If Parliament is not prepared to make that assertion, one wonders what it is for.

Gordon Prentice: I would like to speak to what the Public Administration Committee said about the prerogative powers. I mentioned earlier that the former Foreign Secretary, Lord Hurd, wanted a change. He told us that
	"modern conditions demanded that any major military action should have explicit parliamentary approval"
	and added that
	"'there should at least be a convention' that 'where there is a substantial exercise involving sending people to kill and be killed on behalf of the country, then that should be with the consent, prior or at any rate immediate, of the House of Commons'."

Elfyn Llwyd: May I support the hon. Gentleman's argument by saying that, allegedly, according to the Government, there was a convention that the Attorney-General's full opinion should not be disclosed, although that was proved to be wrong? This Bill would make sure that that opinion is also produced.

Paul Flynn: It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for North Thanet (Mr. Gale). I agree with almost every word of his speech. It is good that the speeches we have heard so far have been serious speeches about the issue that faces us. We all know the reality of this place: we know that there are assassins of Friday morning Bills who turn up regularly. They are often the same people, with the same briefing from the Whips Office. I have not received any briefing about the Bill from the Whips Office this morning; it must be an oversight. I appeal, however, to Members who may have such misinformation about their persons to ignore it, listen to the serious debate on the Bill, and look to their role as parliamentarians.
	Only twice in my lifetime has my country gone to war without the wholehearted support of the entire nation. Those occasions were Suez and the second war in Iraq. At the time of Suez, we were given a good deal of propaganda about this great attempt to liberate the world and stand up for western civilisation, but we all know now that it was actually a squalid conspiracy between Britain, France and Israel. It was an entirely unjustified war, which resulted in loss of life.
	It worries me greatly that, as the hon. Member for North Thanet pointed out, we did not vote on the first Iraq war, but in the Adjournment debate that took place I voiced my support for the invasion because of Iraq's action against Kuwait. There were very few casualties in that war, but one was a young man from a family who were well known, and who lived on the edge of my constituency. I have often thought about how I would justify my action to the parents and the brothers and sisters of that young man. Could my action in supporting the war justify the loss of his life? It is the most serious questions that we, as parliamentarians, must ask ourselves. Can we say that a person died in a cause that was noble and worthwhile?
	I believe that our troops, particularly in their peacekeeping role, have performed a splendid task in Kosovo, Bosnia, Sierra Leone and other parts of the world, and that we are doing a job that is worthy of their courage and their sacrifice. But the war in Iraq—

Jon Trickett: The debate on 25 November was on a motion that said that the Security Council should meet further to consider the situation if Iraq failed to comply. That immediately preceded military deployment to Iraq in December, when the drumbeats of war were already loud. The motion relating to the final opportunity for Iraq to comply was debated in February, by which time troops were already on the ground and war was imminent.

Tony Lloyd: The hon. Gentleman is making an intelligent speech, although I profoundly disagree with his conclusions, but may I take him back to a different conflict? I was personally involved as a Minister when Britain went to war with the then Yugoslavia over Kosovo. He is right to suggest that one of the differences is that there was a widely held view that military action was morally justified and it therefore obtained a fair amount of public support. However, there are some fundamental issues even in such a war. For example, there were some difficult legal issues about the legitimacy of the military campaign. There was a fundamental difference of opinion between the British and French Governments. Even though we both concluded that there was a legal base for action, it was a different legal base.
	It is fundamental that any Government must come before the House of Commons and be forced to justify the decision to go to war because it is of such profound importance. The hon. Gentleman makes an interesting point and I understand what he is saying, but I ask him to consider that the convoluted political process that we went through in the months before the second Iraq war was not just a straightforward series of decisions. A lot of other political issues were involved. A simple decision about going to war is better taken if it has an absolute statutory base, so that we know why and what we are voting for on the day that that vote takes place.

Richard Ottaway: The hon. Gentleman talks about changing circumstances, but is it not the case that future wars are more likely to be fought on the basis of intelligence than of circumstances that can be seen? We have already had one war based on flawed intelligence. Would not the Bill oblige the Government to produce the beef and show us the intelligence so that we could make up our own minds about the circumstances that existed?

Tom Levitt: I am coming on to that point, but mission creep is almost inevitable under the Bill because of the way that circumstances in which military action can take place are prescribed. The question of what happens when orders are given under changed circumstances is an interesting one. The legitimacy of military orders is clearly based on instructions given through the proper channels to commanders in the field. Under the Bill, however, it would based on information presented to Parliament, preferably prior to the engagement. I therefore envisage a number of difficulties when circumstances change, and they include the example that my hon. Friend gave of a peacekeeping operation going wrong and soldiers having to defend themselves and take out hostile forces that were not active at the time of the original commission.

Tony Lloyd: If memory serves, in the overwhelming majority of military actions in which the nation has been involved in recent years we have participated with the United States, which has the same kind of power that my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Ladywood (Clare Short) wishes to introduce. Why does it not operate as a constraint against the US taking military action but would do so for the UK?

Tom Levitt: No, I want to draw my remarks to a close; plenty of other people want to speak.
	Every time that troops have been deployed by this Government—whether in Kosovo in 1999, Sierra Leone in May 2000, Afghanistan in October 2001 and even Iraq in March 2003—the purpose has been to reduce the risk of death and the overall death rate. That may sound odd when one considers the fact that military action tends to increase those things, but in all those circumstances our intervention has aimed, over a period, to end injustice, genocide and mass murder. On that basis, I would argue that every one of those deployments has been justified.
	It is extremely unlikely that the House would ever decide, after military deployment had taken place, to pull troops out on the grounds that the safety of troops in those circumstances is paramount. I do not see that happening, even if the facility to do so is provided by the Bill.
	There should be scrutiny of decisions on military action, as with anything else in this House, and that scrutiny should be timely. There should be a substantive vote wherever possible, but that should not be compulsory. It should not be put into law and it should not tie the Government's hands, as I believe the Bill would. The debate has been very interesting, but the Bill should not reach the statute book. It could, in some circumstances, be used as an indulgence to feed a bandwagon of anti-war sentiment, with no practical purpose. It might even be used by some to try to justify their support for military action in Iraq at one point, followed by a change of heart after the event.

Greg Mulholland: Unlike the hon. Member for High Peak (Tom Levitt), I welcome the Bill; in fact I returned to the House especially to support it, having attended a south Asian earthquake fundraising event in Leeds yesterday evening.
	If I may start by being so bold, and despite being from a different party, I must confess to having something of a soft spot for the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Ladywood (Clare Short).—[Interruption.] I am blushing. I believe that she is one of a group of MPs from all parties who show real principle and passion in their parliamentary duties. I also share the right hon. Lady's passion for international development, the brief that I have just taken on for my party. I have to say that despite being from a different political background, I felt disappointment, disillusionment and dismay when she initially came out in favour of the war in Iraq. It was with a sense of relief, reassurance and not a little rejoicing with those of a similar mind on such issues that I greeted the news that the right hon. Lady realised that she had been misled, had reached a mistaken conclusion and had the courage to admit that. It is very good to have her back doing what she does best.
	I was not an MP at that time; indeed, I am here partly because of the decision to take this country into the disastrous war in Iraq. I shall make a rather surprising point now. To some extent I agree with the hon. Member for North Wiltshire (Mr. Gray) that the subject of this debate is not the decision to go to war in Iraq—a decision that was always immoral, was always illegal and is now so sadly and obviously disastrous. The point underlying the Bill is that in a 21st-century democracy it is grotesque that the Prime Minister can take the nation to war without having to come to this place, the seat of our democracy, for approval.
	I take exception to some of the arguments of the hon. Member for High Peak. The first is the idea that when presented with the evidence, which surely is the point, 659 MPs are not capable of making a sensible decision on war. That is an insult to the House. The suggestion that we cannot quickly respond to conflicts such as that in Rwanda is, too, an insult to the House. Those of us with humanitarian concerns would do so.

Greg Mulholland: May I finish my assault? I will then let the hon. Gentleman respond to all my points. That would be sensible for both of us.
	The hon. Gentleman suggested that those who are anti-war or are pacifist are not valid participants in the proceedings of the House. That is a serious point. It suggests that Quakers should not become Members of the House. The hon. Gentleman should rethink those comments. I will now give way and let him answer.

Greg Mulholland: The hon. Gentleman and I probably have different views about what the House should and should not consider. I think that we will have to agree to disagree. I will not be too forceful. I am glad that we are quite a long way apart from each other, should I get on the wrong side of the hon. Gentleman, because I have been advised that that would not be a wise thing to do.
	The Prime Minister can take the decision to go to war without consulting this place, but that is not the only issue that arises from the use of the royal prerogative. Charter88 has drawn attention to other abuses of its use. I would not describe it in those terms, but I think that the hon. Member for North Wiltshire (Mr. Gray) used that word. For example, the country was taken into the Marrakesh agreement, which binds us into the general agreement on trades and services in the World Customs Organisation. I think that many of us would be strongly and passionately opposed to that.
	I am a new Member. Since I came to the House a few months ago I have asked myself many times, "Why do we do things like this?" I am sick and tired of hearing the same answers—"Because we do" or "Because we always have." That is not good enough in a 21st century democracy. In my opinion, one of the most dangerous things is to defend the use of the royal prerogative in terms of "Because we always have." Of the decisions that involve use of the royal prerogative, surely that to take this country to war is the most serious.
	If I may widen the discussion, all this shows why we need a written constitution and a Bill of Rights. I ask all Members who feel passionately about this issue and similar issues to engage seriously in that wider discussion. Ultimately, we need a written constitution to stop the excesses of Prime Ministers such as Thatcher and Blair. I am sure that many Members on both sides of the House would agree.

Greg Mulholland: No. I am about to conclude.
	We have all heard of the coalition of the willing. Given that there are principled Members such as the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Ladywood and many others who have bothered to be in the Chamber for a Friday sitting, we need to have a coalition of the enlightened. Let us bring the constitution up to date. Let us start by taking away from the Prime Minister the decision to take the country to war and returning it to this place.

Neil Gerrard: I am pleased to take part in the debate and to support my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Ladywood (Clare Short). As she said, I introduced an almost identical Bill during the previous Session. Unfortunately, I was not drawn anywhere near as high in the ballot as my right hon. Friend. Then, of course, the general election intervened. As a result, there was no real debate of my Bill. I recall that when I introduced my Bill in January it was assumed by many Members who spoke to me and by many outside the House that the only reason for it was opposition to the war in Iraq, and that no one could possibly support the Bill who had not been in opposition to that war.
	That is completely untrue. There was no reason why someone who thought that the war in Iraq was justified should not support the Bill. Its origins were not purely that war. My hon. Friend the Member for Pendle (Mr. Prentice), who was a member of the Public Administration Committee, conducted an inquiry into the royal prerogative. It was not an inquiry into the use of the royal prerogative in war, but went much wider than that. However, the use of the royal prerogative in that respect was one example that happened to coincide with others that some of us were concerned about and which we wished to take up.
	I make no secret of the fact that my opposition to the war was one of the reasons for my interest in taking forward the Bill, but it was not the only one by a long stretch of the imagination. I think that it was in March—I would have to check the date—that I raised questions arising from the Bill in Prime Minister's Question Time. In responding to me, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said that he could not foresee any future situation where a Prime Minister would go to war without a substantive vote in the House. He cited the vote on Iraq as an example.
	I have two comments about that. The fact that the Prime Minister said what he did does not give any guarantees for the future. There will be other Prime Ministers, and maybe Prime Ministers of parties other than Labour. The fact that the current Prime Minister has said that, in his view, it would not be possible to enter into a conflict such as Iraq in future without a substantive vote does not amount to a guarantee.
	My hon. Friend the Member for Pendle put his finger on the critical issue about the decision to go to war and the mechanisms used. If the Prime Minister believes that there should be a substantive vote in the future, it is worth noting that I have heard virtually no Members arguing that there should not be such a vote, whether before or after the event.

Neil Gerrard: I think that the hon. Gentleman would acknowledge that the majority of Members who have taken part in the debate so far, and the majority of Members generally, judging by the numbers who have signed early-day motions about the Bill, would agree that there should be substantive votes.
	If there are to be such substantive votes, what matters is the mechanism. My hon. Friend the Member for Pendle raised some important issues about the mechanisms by which the decisions were taken on Iraq, and if we are to have substantive votes on decisions about armed conflict, it makes all sorts of sense that the mechanism for those substantive votes are laid down in the way that the Bill does, and are not left to be decided by convention or precedent, which can change, which some future Government or Minister could decide they do not like and so adopt a different method. That is the really important function of the Bill. It sets down the mechanism by which those substantive votes have to be taken.
	Some of the opposition that I have heard seems to ignore the facts of what has happened in recent years on armed conflicts. Iraq is the only conflict that I can think of that we have been involved in where it could be said that it was intelligence driven. That certainly has not been true of other conflicts in the past 20 years. Kosovo certainly was not—and may I say in response to a point made earlier that there was some opposition on action in Kosovo, although there was never a vote on a substantive motion; the debates on Kosovo all took place on motions on the Adjournment of the House, and, by certain recourse, some hon. Members obtained Divisions on such motions artificially to express their opposition to what was happening in Kosovo. I think that there were five debates on the Falklands, all on a motion on the Adjournment of the House. But there have been other cases, going back to 1950 and Korea, and then the first Gulf war, where there were votes on substantive motions within a few days of the action commencing. Iraq was unusual in that there was a substantive motion before the action started.
	We all talk about going war, but in reality declaration of war does not happen, or certainly seems very unlikely to happen again. There has not been a formal declaration of war for a long, long time by this country or by many other countries. It is important that it is still covered within the Bill, because it could happen, but that is not the reality of the way in which military action generally happens now.
	I certainly do not buy arguments that say that that would take away elements of surprise. I am sure that Saddam Hussein was really surprised when military action started, or that it was a surprise when our forces went into Kosovo or Afghanistan.

Neil Gerrard: I understand my hon. Friend's point, and it is perfectly valid because it is mentioned in the Bill. This is a point that could be explored in Committee if it was felt that the measure was drawn to widely, but I would not expect the report to Parliament that clause 2 demands to be so narrowly drawn as to prevent any flexibility in action. We are all realistic enough to know that we cannot be prescriptive about future military action. The point is valid, and perhaps we can explore it in Committee.
	I cannot believe the argument that the element of surprise would be taken away, and the Bill would not stop troops acting in self-defence.
	I entered this House in 1992 and can recall debates about Bosnia and Rwanda in which hon. Members suggested that intervention should take place and the Government resisted them. Perhaps the Bill should be amended in Committee to allow Back Benchers to propose to the Government that military action should take place.

Geoff Hoon: My hon. Friend raises an interesting problem. When a situation is deteriorating, which is not uncommon when troops are deployed for peacekeeping purposes, those troops may then be attacked. I accept that the Bill appears to allow them to defend themselves, but as soon as they do so, are not they engaged in an armed conflict, and would not that involve the Government coming back to the House to seek the kind of resolution that the Bill requires? Surely that is impractical in the context of troops deployed in the field.

Neil Gerrard: I think that we are getting into areas that should be dealt with in Committee.
	Members have raised the issues of urgency and self-defence, as well as situations where the two might become conflated. We need to get it right, but I believe that that can be achieved and that there is nothing in the Bill that could not be amended if necessary. Clearly, we would not want to put troops in a position in which they feel that they are behaving illegally. The point about the Dutch troops in Srebrenica is very important. We do not want British troops to get into a position where they are standing by as people are being massacred. If there is a clause that would genuinely allow that, we need to amend it.

Sadiq Khan: My hon. Friend makes a good point, and I draw his attention to clause 10, dealing with interpretation, which seeks to define armed conflict. I agree that clause 8 is worthy of more discussion and debate in Committee because there is real concern, not just about multinational forces, such as NATO, but about peacekeeping forces and the role that they play. That will be worth considering in Committee once the Bill's drafters have the expert advice that has been so useful on other Bills.
	The objection has been made that we will lose the element of surprise. I hope that that has been rebutted by examples of previous conflicts in which there clearly has been no element of surprise, but it is also rebutted by the Bill's retrospective provisions. Other concerns have been expressed by colleagues. I hope that as a new Member I am not being too arrogant by making this point, but the House of Commons is not equipped to make decisions as important as whether we should go to war.
	The third main objection to the Bill, with which I disagree profoundly, is that it might encourage our Prime Minister or a Secretary of State to mislead the House because they would have to come here to justify their actions. Another objection to the Bill was that it could have an impact on advice given by an Attorney-General.

Jon Trickett: Those of us who believe that the Bill is correct should be happy with the debate so far. With one possible exception, no one has argued against the principle of parliamentary votes on going to war or against votes taking place in advance. The objections concern issues of detail. People who argue that, because the detail is not correct in clauses 2 and 8, the legislation itself is fundamentally flawed must answer two questions. First, why do no other western Government apart from France have a Head of Government with the extraordinary powers that our Head of Government has? Every other western Government have legislation similar to the Bill. If the problematic details in the Bill were such that the legislation undermined its own principles it would not have been possible to frame legislation that worked elsewhere because, as has been suggested, no democracy would put its troops at risk.
	Secondly, on the general principles of the Bill, some hon. Members have implied that they would result in the legislature becoming a second Executive power, but that is to fundamentally misunderstand the roles of the legislature and the Executive. It is the job of the Government and the armed forces to execute the decisions of the House and the legislature. It is for the legislature to agree issues in principle and scrutinise the Executive's actions. It would be inappropriate for the legislation to detail precisely the way in which the armed forces conduct their business, nor does it seek to do so. It is simply saying that the legislature should take its rightful place alongside the Executive. It should scrutinise the Executive and give general authority to their actions, but it should not take on the role of the Executive themselves. There is nothing in the legislation to suggest otherwise. Some provisions may need to be refined, and we have already debated whether we should do so on Second Reading or in Committee. It is appropriate to raise such matters, but they do not provide sufficient reason to vote against the Bill.
	If the legislature had had the power to operate alongside the Executive in the Iraqi war, a number of matters would have been debated in more detail, and it is inconceivable that we would have held a substantive vote in March. What precisely had the UN inspectors found? What was the nature of the international coalition that had started to fall apart? What was the legality of the war? Clearly, a report would have been presented to the House giving the opinions of Government lawyers on the legality of the war. What would be the position of Iraq after the war? That was not debated, and the allies clearly failed to take it fully into account. If Parliament had debated the relevant issues, it is inconceivable that it would not have debated a post-conflict Iraq. Similarly, the lack of thorough consideration on the part of the Government about what would happen after a war would have emerged.
	The legislature would also have been able to discuss in detail the implications of the conflict for international terrorism. The rise of such terrorism has been fuelled by the conflict. Finally, the nature of the intelligence, which turned out to be wholly flawed, would have been subject to scrutiny. It would have been the proper role of the legislature to debate all those matters, but that does not mean that it would have passed a resolution giving detailed and precise instructions to the Executive about how they should execute a decision to go to war or how troops should be deployed. Nothing in the Bill or the principles behind it implies otherwise. For all those reasons the Bill is appropriate.
	The Iraq war has been mentioned many times this morning. If we look back, we see that the key decision that led to war was taken in December, when the troops were deployed in Iraq. Almost immediately, there was a debate about how long we could wait before the war was waged because of the extremes of temperature and the climate. The drumbeat of war had become strong at the time of the deployment, and the time scale was effectively known then because the troops were on the ground and it would not have been possible, because of the logistics and other factors, to wage a war much later than March.
	Those people who say that we do not need the Bill because a substantive vote took place that March mistake what happened and have not thought clearly about the history of the dispute. The relevant substantive motion is the one that was debated in the November before the troops were deployed. The terms of the Government resolution are clear. That debate—I had an exchange with the hon. Member for North Wiltshire (Mr. Gray) about this—was about international diplomacy, the role of the United Nations and the construction of a coalition. At no time then was a resolution proposed that envisaged no alternative but to go to war. Yet, after the vote, that motion was cited as justification for placing troops in Iraq, which, as I said, committed us irrevocably to the conflict that took place in March.

James Gray: The point is that on 25 November an amendment to the Government motion was tabled by Labour Back Benchers that said that under no circumstances should there be war against or invasion of Iraq. That resulted in the entire debate being on the question whether we should deploy armed force against Iraq.

Peter Soulsby: It is significant that, with a couple of notable eccentric exceptions, the majority of Members who have spoken against the Bill have done so not on the basis of principle—parliamentary scrutiny and approval of proposed armed conflicts—but on the two themes of necessity and the problems associated with implementation. I shall deal with those themes one at a time.
	On necessity, it is argued that following the events in the run-up to the Iraq war a convention has been established or the principles have been set, or the promises have been made, that make any future move towards armed conflicts a matter that will inevitably come before the House for a substantive vote. That may be the case. It may be that it is inevitable, now that the precedent has been set and perhaps a convention established. However, that is not the point.
	It is not the point because such conventions and such principles would not provide for a proper legal framework for consideration. They would not provide for reliable information to be in front of the House on which it could base its consideration and its decision; they would not allow for proper scrutiny; and they would not guarantee approval in advance. It is important that we have a proper legal framework. Perhaps it is even more important that that framework is established to ensure proper consideration not only in the Houses of Parliament but in the Government. If one thing is evident from the way that we went into the conflict in Iraq it is that such proper consideration did not take place. The House should support the Bill for the sake of the Government's democratic accountability and proper consideration within Government.
	The Bill is not just about Iraq, although many of us still feel very bitterly the anger and betrayal of that appalling blunder, and are reminded of it with every suicide bomb that explodes and every day's newspapers that we open in which we read of events there. As my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow (Mr. Gerrard) pointed out earlier, we should support the Bill not just because of our opposition to the war in Iraq, but because of our experience of the way in which we went into that war. Hon. Members on both sides of the Chamber who have spoken today in support of the Bill may take very different views on the armed conflict, but they want to ensure that any future potential armed conflict is given proper consideration in the House and by the Government.
	The other criticism of the Bill has related to problems associated with it. Inevitably, some legitimate issues have been raised about the Bill's implementation, but all are matters that can be sorted out in Committee. In my very limited experience, the problems with the Bill are no greater than those in many other Bills making their first appearance in the House.
	When we were moving inexorably, as it seemed, towards the Iraq war, many inside and outside the House campaigned under the banner "Not in our name". The Bill gives us an opportunity to say that, in future, without proper consideration, information and consent, it will be never again in our name.

Andrew Dismore: My heart is very much behind the sentiments of the Bill but my head tells me that it is an unworkable proposition. It is so badly drafted, from the long title to the commencement clause, as to be fatally flawed and not worthy of receiving a Second Reading. It is a recipe for indecision and parliamentary stalemate, and for judicial intervention in matters that are rightly for Government. It could endanger the lives of our service personnel and has the potential to criminalise our armed forces under domestic and international law.
	We have heard a lot today about the war in Iraq—old arguments that we have debated many times. However, this is not about Iraq—it is about the potential future commitment of our armed forces. It is inconceivable, given the way in which the conventions have developed over the years, that any Prime Minister would willingly commit our country to war without the support of this House expressed in an Adjournment debate or a vote such as that which we had on the war in Iraq. It is inconceivable that our Prime Minister could have continued if that vote had gone against him and—I go further—if a majority of Government Members had not voted for the Government's resolution.
	What difference would the Bill have made to the war in Iraq? It would have made no difference to the way in which the debates have continued in the House. I doubt that the criteria for which clause 2 provides would have made a difference to the information that the Prime Minister and the Government laid before the House. The dossier, whether it was criticised or not, would have been the same. The legal advice from the Attorney-General, brief or full, would have been the same. Exactly the same information would have been presented to the House. In presenting the Bill, I suspect that there is an element of sour grapes on the part of those who lost the vote.

Andrew Dismore: My hon. Friend is right. Let us suppose that Saddam Hussein was preparing to use a chemical weapon or even a conventional weapon against Jerusalem. Let us suppose that he had deployed it. What would have been the consequences not only for the Iraq conflict but the middle east and the world?

Andrew Dismore: That presages my arguments under clause 8. I am not sure that that was necessarily the case. As I recall, one of the arguments in relation to Srebrenica concerned the rules of engagement under which the UN was operating at the time. Part of the problem was that they were restrictive and ambiguous, and, facing that, the Dutch troops did not feel willing to commit themselves. As my right hon. Friend's requirement under clause 8 is that action must be either "following a lawful command" or
	"in accordance with lawful rules of engagement",
	those troops are left in an ambiguous position. They do not have time to phone up the Prime Minister to ask him to apply retrospectively for a motion in Parliament, or to wait for a vote in Parliament to decide whether they are allowed to shoot back. I shall return to those arguments later.
	I presaged my concerns about clause 2 when I intervened on the question of judicial intervention. It is not a question of the courts overruling Parliament, but of the courts interpreting and ruling on whether the Government's interpretation of what Parliament has decided is lawful and reasonable. Let me give an example. One of the matters that the Government must lay before Parliament is the expected duration of the participation in armed conflict. Let us suppose that the Government say that the war will be over by Christmas—it has been known before—and that the war is still going on at Easter. There is nothing to stop somebody going to the courts to seek judicial review, saying, "The Government are continuing a war without lawful authority, because Parliament debated it on the general understanding that the war would be over by Christmas. It hasn't happened that way. Please, judge, give me an injunction to require the Government to withdraw their troops."

Chris Grayling: The hon. Gentleman rather anticipates my remarks and is putting words into my mouth before I have uttered them. If he will be patient, I shall explain what I really think. I understand the motivation for the Bill and the sentiments behind it. I have misgivings and shall set some of them out before I set out my and my colleagues' approach.
	My most fundamental misgiving is anxiety about introducing a legal framework to what is always an extremely difficult area of political life and national leadership. Difficult decisions have to be taken quite quickly, and it worries me that we may end up putting our national leaders into a position in which they have to look over their shoulders and worry about the legal implications of what they do when we trust them to take quick decisions on behalf of the nation. We can hold them to account if they take the wrong decisions, but if we stop trusting them to take those decisions and start to put in place a legal framework that constrains them from doing so, I fear that there may be unintended consequences.
	Let me draw a parallel that throws light on that. I have been extremely anxious about the way in which serving soldiers—not when there have been clear abuses in military prisons, but in front-line situations where young soldiers take snap decisions—find themselves facing a court case over their conduct. We send young soldiers on to the battlefield with little experience of what they will face, and increasingly we seem ready to use the force of law to challenge difficult and sometimes wrong decisions that they make in the heat of battle.
	The same applies equally to politicians. Nobody believes that any politician goes into conflict lightly. Nobody believes that it is not the most difficult decision any political leader can take. We have to leave them the freedom to take that decision. If we wrap them in a legal framework that constrains them from doing what they think right, we may ultimately come to regret it.
	The important thing to remember is that the royal prerogative was not used over Iraq. What happened in the run-up to the Iraq war was pretty much exactly the process that the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Ladywood (Clare Short) is asking for. We cannot end up jeopardising decision making by putting in place impediments in situations that we cannot anticipate. The example of Srebrenica has been given. The right hon. Lady said that she had not looked into reports on that case, and nor have I. I always fear, however, that laws can have unintended consequences, and I should not want that to happen.
	I am concerned about the implications for the morale of our soldiers. What happens if we have a vote in the House on a conflict that is carried by a majority of one? Is that really a clear mandate for our troops? Can they honestly go into battle knowing that they have the full confidence of Parliament?
	Another point was made earlier about information being provided to enemies. Clause 4(6) of the Bill talks about the Prime Minister providing
	"such information as he considers it appropriate to make public about . . . the expected geographical extent of that participation . . . the expected duration of that participation".
	I appreciate that the right hon. Lady has written in the words
	"such information as he considers it appropriate"
	but the political pressures will be such that the Prime Minister will be forced to provide perhaps more information than is strategically sensible in an attempt to win consent for the action that he has taken. That causes me concern as well.
	I am equally concerned about the provisions that require a vote in both Houses. What would happen if the two Houses did not agree—if the motion was passed in one but not the other? There is an issue about the relationship between the two Houses. I do not want to get into a great debate about whether the other place should be elected, appointed or whatever. The reality is that this place is the democratically elected House. It thus seems illogical to try to achieve balance between both Houses in making a decision, and we need to understand clearly why the right hon. Lady has included that provision before we press ahead with a measure such as this.
	I also have anxieties about the publication of legal advice, although not because it is wrong to do so. Looking back at the run-up to the Iraq war, it is clear that the issue of the Attorney-General's advice was of great significance. The leaks of that advice and the information revealed since then have given rise to concern about the decision-making process and how the Prime Minister approached his decision to intervene in Iraq. There is no question about that. However, I do not want us to be in a position where published legal advice leads to court cases about the legitimacy or otherwise of political decisions. In issues such as that, we cannot be governed by our judges; we must be governed by our sovereign Parliament—by the democratically elected representatives of the nation. I have a significant reservation about laying on the table legal justification and legal opinion, using that as a reference point and opening ourselves up to court cases that challenge the sovereignty of Parliament.

Chris Grayling: I am about to conclude my remarks so that the Leader of the House can speak, so I cannot give way.
	The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) asked me about my party's view. We have thought carefully about the matter. I have much sympathy with the aspirations of the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Ladywood, even though I am unhappy about the structure of her Bill. It is my view that the Bill should pass into Committee because the issues that have been raised in the House today merit further discussion and analysis. However, she and the House should not take that as an expression of ultimate support for the Bill. I have misgivings and I have set them out. I do not think that what she has proposed today is necessarily the right solution. However, these are matters of great gravity and my colleagues and I will not oppose the Bill's passage into Committee, even though I shall not give her a guarantee that when it has passed through Committee she will have my support or the support of my colleagues in taking it any further.

Geoff Hoon: I have studiously refrained from referring precisely to what they do or do not do. I have used them an illustration of the problem that could arise. It could arise in relation to any pre-deployment of our forces—for example, an agreement to give permission to an ally to use a British base. The ally might be engaged in armed conflict, the United Kingdom might not. In those circumstances, at what point does the 10-day time frame begin to run? Such practical issues cannot be addressed by legislation of this kind. However much it is attempted, it is not possible to produce legislation that can define and prescribe all the various circumstances, particularly in the modern world. Perhaps it would have been possible in the days when generals arranged a certain date on which a battle might take place, but that is a very 19th-century approach to the 21st-century problems faced by our armed forces.

Martin Horwood: As a new Member of this place, I find some of its procedures confusing, but I have found today's bemusing and disgraceful. I cannot believe that the Leader of the House, as a democrat, would refuse us the opportunity to debate the technicalities that he is discussing in Committee by not allowing the Bill to proceed.

Susan Kramer: I want to make a series of proposals about the future of Waterloo international station. The subject is of major importance to my constituents and the residents of south-west London. To most hon. Members, today may be Trafalgar day, but for our local people, the issue has been described as the second battle of Waterloo. Although I shall argue for a plan that will bring the greatest direct benefits to commuters in the south-west London area, I believe that our proposals make the best sense from a strategic transport perspective. They provide for the best use of platform and track at Waterloo when Eurostar leaves in 2007. The plan is a good transport solution, not parochial special pleading.
	Let me first explain what a loss it will be to my constituents when Eurostar moves to St. Pancras. If the Under-Secretary speaks to Eurostar, she will find that many if not most of the regular, core users of the service—the people who go once or twice every week to Paris and Brussels—live in south-west London. If they continue to use Eurostar, their journeys will be half an hour or perhaps an hour longer. For many, the move to St. Pancras marks the end of convenient rail travel to the continent and they will return to the airlines. At a time when we are looking for more rail opportunities, we in south-west London are about to get fewer.
	The Under-Secretary will also know that the track that enabled Eurostar to run into Waterloo was used before that for south-west London services. We gave up that track because Eurostar was such an important project and in the expectation that Eurostar would serve Waterloo for the long term. As one constituent said to me, "Now they don't need it, we would like it back, please."
	Let us deal with the Arup report, which the Strategic Rail Authority commissioned and was published last week, on "Alternative Uses for Waterloo International Station". We welcome that report. It lays to rest the suggestion that Waterloo international should be given over to shops rather than trains. It also emphasises that decisions need to be made quickly so that an exceptional opportunity is not missed and assets of great value and quality are not left idle.
	As I interpret Arup, several proposed options for use of the station offer few realistic benefits. For example, diverting the diesel service from Paddington to Waterloo makes little sense, as Waterloo cannot accommodate diesel trains and, in any case, that would add some 20 minutes to the journey time. Diverting trains that currently have a Victoria destination to Waterloo would reproduce the same overcrowding that is cited as a problem at Victoria. That will not get us anywhere.
	Diverting trains from Charing Cross to Waterloo would cut those services off from London Bridge. Passengers with destinations in all the new offices developing to the east, including Canary Wharf, would find themselves arriving at Waterloo, piling into trains at Waterloo East or swamping the Jubilee line, which is already very crowded despite the addition of the seventh car. We would misuse the Jubilee line with that approach.
	I recognise that commuters from the south-east require additional rail services. However, they will soon have the benefits from channel tunnel rail link 2, which will free up domestic capacity from Kent. Thameslink 2000 is in the pipeline. It is in the last stages of inquiry. That line meets not only the current but the future needs of the south-east as well as bringing regeneration and new opportunity to London Bridge. Let us not forget also, for the people of east London, the East London line and the docklands light railway extension, which are being progressed by Transport for London.
	I accept that there is some scope in the argument that a temporary diversion from Charing Cross to Waterloo could speed up the building of Thameslink 2000, but some assumptions behind those numbers, particularly after having talked to the industry, suggest that the number of trains that would have to be diverted to achieve any serious benefit is quite heroic, considering the available track capacity. As I said before, that would leave us with commuters coming to Waterloo and attempting to reach their destinations with great difficulty—a recipe for chaos. I ask the Government to look at that option very closely before being persuaded by it.
	We therefore come to services for south-west London as the obvious and best use of the former Eurostar platforms and access tracks. Using the Eurostar platforms for the Windsor line would be a pretty modest change involving some work on platforms, signalling and the platform entrances and exits. Commuters would at once see a performance benefit, so that South West Trains would no longer regularly have services stopping and waiting outside Waterloo. Nothing makes commuters more furious than being stopped in sight of their destination, hoping that a platform will be freed up.
	Clearly, if, in addition to the Windsor line being shifted over, the Nine Elms viaduct was removed—it would no longer be needed by Eurostar—we could achieve a far greater improvement in reliability and have wider platforms, which I would argue is a needed safety measure at rush hour. All Members have to do is go to look at people piling off the trains. There would be real potential for more services.
	The Nine Elms viaduct, as the Minister will remember, was put in place to allow Eurostar to cross over into its platforms, but at the cost of taking out a line that previously served South West Trains. The cost of removing the viaduct is estimated to be between £30 million and £80 million. It is a tidy sum, but it is minor in transport investment terms. There would be greater reliability, less overcrowding and potentially more services—very important gains. There would be benefits not only for my constituents, but for virtually every community along that south-west train line.
	Beyond all that, there is the potential for a far more ambitious plan to build a flyover completely to upgrade the capacity to bring additional trains from Clapham junction into Waterloo, changing the role of those stations. That would finally accommodate the rapidly growing demand for rail services from Woking and beyond, but also meet the needs of south-west London commuters.
	Transport for London has been very clear about its interest in considering an orbital rail scheme linking key stations in outer London to take pressure off radial routes and to provide a real alternative to the car, but that would require turning Clapham junction into a proper hub for stopping trains. The flyover—bringing additional trains into Waterloo, which I just mentioned—could be the linchpin to allowing that to happen and to creating the potential for proper orbital travel.
	We are talking serious money, as the estimated amount is £300 million, but no one is saying that this should be done instantly. All the steps that I have spoken of could be staged, producing an immediate win, but leaving the option for more investment and more gains in the medium and long terms.
	As a final option, I must mention Airtrack. This scheme, which would bring passengers by rail from Heathrow's terminal 5 via Staines and Richmond to Waterloo, is an option that the Government and BAA are seriously considering. It offers a way to cut Heathrow traffic congestion and improve air quality. My constituents would greatly value this service and the use of a former Eurostar platform would be ideal. My plans can accommodate that proposal.
	We in south-west London have a growing need for more rail services to meet increasing demand with less crowding and less unreliability. In response to a written parliamentary question on 14 October 2005, the Department for Transport provided numbers that again showed South West Trains as the most overcrowded in London in 2003, and as the second most overcrowded in 2004. Industry players tell me that the projected growth in commuting is especially heavy in the south-west and that it will not be less than the predictions in the route utilisation strategy study of a 20 per cent. increase in demand from 2007 to 2017. The same report also warns that capacity for such growth might not be available.
	Unusually, in considering the south-west commuter, the demand is exceptionally high in off-peak as well as peak periods. That is very different from the south-east, and again it demands additional service. We know from our own communities that the system is under pressure. In our areas of London, we are also aware that road congestion is worse year on year. Parts of my constituency, in both Richmond and Kingston, are frequently close to gridlock. Without a step change in rail services, we will never be able to unlock the car traffic problem and make the shift from road use to public transport.
	A few minutes ago, I listed all the new rail projects completed in or planned for east London. When I ask about similar investment in the core infrastructure in south-west London services, however, I usually get a blank look. After much thought, and having asked questions of a number of people, a member of the rail industry finally volunteered that there had been an upgrade in the power supply and some money for signalling, but no one could come up with anything else since privatisation. That is a long period to go without major investment in core infrastructure. In fact, the biggest thing that has happened to us since privatisation is losing a track to Eurostar, and then losing Eurostar.
	The current South West Trains franchise expires in February 2007, and the replacement process is already under way. The Strategic Rail Authority-Department for Transport southern regional planning assessment will be published in spring 2006, when the Network Rail utilisation study for the south-west main line routes will also go to consultation. Time is of the essence. I urge the Minister to recognise the needs of south-west train users. The availability of a facility such as the Eurostar terminal is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity. I hope that she will acknowledge the strength of our case, give us the decision timetable and move rapidly to formal consultation. My constituents are not being parochial when they come to the Minister and ask for this opportunity to improve rail service and transport in our area; it is desperately needed.